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Foreword  
The Education Policy Institute is an independent, impartial and evidence based research institute 
which aims to promote high quality education outcomes for all, through analysis that both informs 
and influences the policy debate in England and internationally. 
Last year, the UK Government established a review, to consider the future funding options for post 
18 education in England. The policy and political concerns which seemed to lead to the 
establishment of the review touched on a variety of issues: student and parental concern over 
relatively high English tuition fees; the failure of the 2010/11 higher education funding reforms to 
create the expected "market" of varying tuition fee levels; associated concerns about the efficiency 
of the higher education sector; and interest in considering whether education routes below Level 6 
HE should be better funded, including in terms of student maintenance. Higher education funding 
has also become a salient education funding issue since the Labour Party promised to abolish tuition 
fees, in their 2017 General Election manifesto. 
This EPI report looks at the options for post 18 funding reform, and considers the likely impact, cost 
and distributional consequences of the major funding choices being considered. 
The analysis highlights some of the challenges facing policy-makers. Many of the most widely 
discussed policy options would be likely to have little or no impact on participation or education 
quality, and higher earning graduates would often be the major gainers from reform - even though it 
is arguable that in education terms they are not the obvious priority at a time when difficult public 
spending choices are necessary. 
We hope that this report will help policy-makers to arrive at decisions with a clear understanding of 
the costs and benefits of different options. As always, we welcome comment on the analysis and 
conclusions in this publication. 
  
 
 
Rt. Hon David Laws 
Executive Chairman 
Education Policy Institute. 
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Executive Summary 
In 2019, the first major review into post-18 education funding since the 2010 Browne review will 
deliver its findings. Unlike the Browne review, the remit of the 2019 review is not limited to higher 
education; the further education system is also within scope and there is a focus on greater 
consistency across the whole tertiary system.  
There are many issues for this review and the government to consider, from how to stimulate 
demand for part-time higher education, to increasing participation in training among young adults 
who leave school without level 3 qualifications. After years of significant shifts in the share of higher 
education financed by taxpayers and graduates, the government will also aspire to devise a more 
enduring settlement.  
This report brings together evidence on many of the leading proposals that have been debated since 
the review was launched in early 2018. For each proposal we stress test the evidence behind it, 
describe the budgetary and distributional consequences, and provide recommendations to the 
government. Our recommendations consider the limited room for further spending dictated by the 
terms of the review, though the recently announced changes to the treatment of income contingent 
loans in the national accounts may prompt the government to revisit the need for greater budgetary 
restraint. Where further data or evidence needs to be collected in order to reach a better-informed 
decision, we briefly describe what research should be conducted. 
Pathways for school leavers 
Introducing a UCAS 
tariff floor when 
accessing student 
finance for bachelor 
level qualifications  
School leavers with low prior attainment are less likely than their higher 
attaining peers to complete their qualification, achieve a good pass or earn 
high wage returns. These poorer outcomes, when coupled with the cost of 
providing a bachelor’s degree, have led to proposals to introduce a 
minimum academic standard for access to student loans, often referred to 
as a “tariff floor”.  
 
There are several practical problems that would need to be addressed for 
a floor to be introduced. Firstly, there would need to be some allowance 
for students who access higher education later in their lives, but without 
qualifications which convert into tariff points. Secondly, progression from 
lower levels of qualifications, such as HNCs, HNDs and foundation degrees, 
would need to remain a route to a full bachelor’s degree. 
 
More significantly, whilst the average outcomes for the students who 
would likely be affected are poorer than those of students with higher 
prior attainment, there is evidence that many of these young people still 
benefit from studying for a bachelor’s degree. For example, while over one 
in twenty of those achieving CDD or below at A level drop out in their first 
year, almost two-thirds of those who do complete their bachelor’s degree 
achieve a first or upper second-class degree in their chosen course.  
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Furthermore, there is currently no robust evidence to suggest that these 
students would be better off pursuing alternative qualifications or training. 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that such alternative pathways are 
often lower-funded and poorly sign-posted. What’s more a tariff floor 
would risk restricting access to bachelor level study for young people from 
less advantaged socio-economic backgrounds and certain ethnic groups, 
thereby undermining the aims of successive governments to make higher 
education more accessible to under-represented young people.  
 
In conclusion, our view is that a tariff floor should not be introduced 
without robust evidence that a significant majority of those affected 
would be better off pursuing alternative education or training pathways. 
While this research is undertaken, the government should monitor the 
impact of recent changes to higher education regulation that aim to 
prevent institutions from relaxing entry standards and failing to secure 
positive outcomes for students. 
 
In addition, any savings from such a policy should be spent on raising the 
attainment of disadvantaged young people before they leave school. 
 
Introducing variable 
tuition fees on a 
subject or institution 
basis 
Setting variable tuition fee limits on a subject or institution basis has been 
proposed as a means of encouraging students towards courses with 
greater labour market demand, to ensure that graduate contributions 
reflect their future earnings, and to better reflect the cost of course 
provision.  
 
While a variable fee system can support any one of these objectives, 
negotiating a coherent and enduring balance between all of them is likely 
to prove difficult. At subject level, pricing on delivery cost and labour 
market outcomes often push in opposing directions, with the result 
entirely dependent on the weighting of these competing priorities. At 
institution level, rewarding high graduate returns with additional funding 
can reinforce inequalities by penalising institutions that serve more 
disadvantaged communities and local economies.  
 
Further, as an income contingent loan system blunts price sensitivity, 
varying fees to steer student demand is unlikely to work without quite 
significant fee differentials emerging.  
 
The government should rule out creating a variable fee system that 
attempts to achieve multiple policy goals. While pricing on the basis of 
subject cost to deliver budget savings is feasible, an across-the-board 
lowering of fees offset by varied increases in teaching grants to re-weight 
subject funding may prove simpler and less challenging to implement.  
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Maintenance loans 
for young adults 
accessing first full 
level 3 qualifications 
Those pursuing further study outside the higher education system are not 
entitled to maintenance support, which makes studying for first full level 3 
qualifications difficult for those aged 19-23, despite tuition itself being free 
of charge.  
 
Introducing maintenance loans for these students would address this 
inequity and enable more school leavers who exit without a full level 3 
qualification to take advantage of their right to free tuition. Given the 
significant earning premium that level 3 qualifications provide, a cost of 
£200m to £360m would appear worthwhile.  
 
The government should offer maintenance loans to young adults 
pursuing a first full level 3 qualification.  
Part-time and mature study 
Reducing part-time 
tuition fees 
The tripling of tuition fees is a key reason part-time and mature student 
numbers have declined in England by 63 per cent since 2010, largely due to 
the price sensitivity and debt aversion among this group. While the sharpest 
drops have been among those likely to see small or immaterial returns to 
study, there has also been a fall in sub-groups likely to have larger earnings 
returns.   
 
Providing a part-time teaching grant that is offset by a commensurate 
reduction in fees is one way to counter this fall in demand.  
 
A £1,000 part-time teaching grant per full-time equivalent student would 
have an upfront cost of £251 million per cohort given current enrolment 
numbers. The long-run cost, when compared to the status quo, would likely 
be smaller. The total cost to the government would also depend on the 
number of additional part-time students enticed to enter higher education.  
 
If the government does not make an across-the-board reduction in fees, it 
should consider introducing a teaching grant to lower tuition fee levels for 
part-time students. The government should explore restraining the cost of 
this policy by means-testing the grant and limiting its application to fields of 
study with high returns or with strong labour market demand.  
 
Easing Equivalent 
and Lower 
Qualification 
funding restrictions 
Equivalent and Lower Qualification (ELQ) restrictions, which prevent those 
looking to study at a level at or below which they are already qualified from 
accessing student loans, deter those seeking to reskill later in life. 
 
As reskilling and life-long learning is a key goal of the government’s 
Industrial Strategy, providing further exemptions to ELQ restrictions beyond 
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STEM fields is justified. While any such change would likely increase part-
time student numbers by only a small amount, the cost would also be 
relatively modest.  
 
The government should introduce further ELQ exemptions in fields of 
study with high returns or strong labour market demand. Outcomes for 
students who access student loans as a result of further ELQ exemptions 
should be monitored to ensure the change delivers value for money.  
Student finance 
Reintroducing 
maintenance grants 
Due to the removal of maintenance grants from 2016/17, students from low 
income backgrounds now accumulate the largest student loan debts. For 
this reason, and due to concerns that the loss of grants may harm efforts to 
increase participation among low income households, there have been calls 
for their return.  
 
The financial benefit of restoring grants would only accrue to recipients 
from low income families who go on to earn high incomes, as the bottom 
60 per cent of graduate earners do not pay off their student debt before it 
is written off. There is also no clear evidence that removing grants has 
hampered efforts to attract low income background school leavers into 
higher education, with no noticeable impact on entry rates relative to their 
wealthier peers.  
 
Though the participation gap between lower and higher income young 
people does not appear to have widened significantly, nor has it narrowed 
in recent years. The government must develop and fund a new strategy to 
rescue the widening participation agenda given the failure to make 
improvements in recent years. However, as there is no clear evidence that 
restoring maintenance grants will facilitate an improvement, the 
government should explore funding a range of alternative approaches. 
These should include additional investment to support disadvantaged 
children in the school system, where the attainment gap that contributes to 
the gap in higher education participation manifests.  
 
Reducing tuition fees 
and raising grants 
While reducing tuition fees is a popular proposal for students and many 
parents, it is generally opposed by higher education providers. As current 
per student funding levels are above those envisioned in 2012 when the 
student finance reforms were implemented, a fee reduction could be used 
to bring overall levels of funding closer to those originally intended. Larger 
fee reductions could be offset by an increase in teaching grants, which could 
be targeted at higher-cost subjects to remove the cross-subsidy incentives 
that the 2012 reforms created.  
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Any fee reduction favours high earning graduates by reducing their lifetime 
repayments substantially. Low and middle earners would see little benefit, 
as, at present, most will not fully repay their student debts.   
 
If the government does decide to reduce tuition fee levels, the reduction 
should be at least partially offset by increasing teaching grants, with 
priority given to grants for high-cost subjects. This will reduce unintended 
incentives to recruit into low-cost subjects to cross-subsidise other 
operations.  
 
Changing the 
student loan terms 
Several of the popular proposals for the review, such as reducing fees, 
reintroducing maintenance grants and reducing interest rates are 
regressive, in that they decrease the lifetime contributions of higher earning 
graduates at the expense of taxpayers, whilst doing little for low or middle 
earning graduates.  
 
If the government seeks to maintain a fiscally neutral approach to the 
review without significantly reducing funding for higher education, it will 
need to decide how to offset these reductions in contributions from higher 
earning graduates. Possible changes would include increases in the 
repayment rate or repayment period, or a reduction in the repayment 
threshold.  
 
However, these changes are also likely to be regressive, with greater 
contributions from lower or middle earning graduates. The progressivity of 
the loan system should not be the only consideration in setting the student 
loan terms, not least because equity with those not undertaking higher 
education study must be considered. The government should be clear on 
the distributional impact of its proposed changes and should publish a 
detailed assessment alongside the review recommendations. 
 
Abolishing tuition 
fees 
Abolishing tuition fees is out of the scope of the government’s review but is 
a core pillar of the Labour Party’s education platform. Beyond arguments 
based on the principle of free education, the policy was justified on the basis 
of high fees deterring prospective students. There is limited evidence to 
suggest this has occurred, except for part-time and mature students. Among 
school leavers, the proportion progressing to higher education reached a 
record high of 28 per cent in 2016/17. 
 
The cost of abolishing fees is substantial, with the benefit mostly accruing 
to high earning graduates. There is also little evidence such a change would 
encourage more school leavers from disadvantaged backgrounds to access 
higher education, as the chief barrier they face is lower attainment in 
secondary school. 
 
11 
The government is right to not consider abolishing tuition fees as the goals 
of this policy could be better met by more targeted investments to boost 
part-time and mature student participation and reduce the school 
attainment gap.  
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1. Introduction 
The government’s Post-18 Education and Funding review presents an opportunity for a refresh of 
tertiary policy seven years after the tripling of tuition fees in 2012. During these years average fees 
have grown larger than ministers might have expected, while access for school leavers has 
improved, counter to the expectation of many opponents. A variety of revisions to the student 
finance system have also been made, some with the purpose of reducing public spending, and 
others raising it in response to perceived public dissatisfaction.  
The present system has had several clear successes. A record share of school-leavers, including those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds, now attend university. Lower earning graduates make lower 
lifetime repayments, so the system has also become more progressive than the one it replaced. 
Universities have also seen funding rise by a substantial amount, giving them resources to invest in 
teaching, capital projects and student services.  
There have also been unexpected outcomes. Part-time and mature student numbers have collapsed, 
with a substantial share of the decline attributable to the rise in tuition fees. Price competition 
between providers has also failed to materialise, leading tuition fees to gravitate towards the top of 
the fee cap.  
Tensions between the desire to extract savings from higher education and the need to address 
student and public concerns have also influenced the evolution of the student finance system since 
2012. In 2015 the government sought savings by announcing a freeze of the income repayment 
threshold for student loans at £21,000 for five years, and the removal of maintenance grants for low 
income background students. More recently the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, with 
the government announcing in 2017 a lifting of the repayment threshold to £25,000. Collectively 
these changes have seen the balance of funding contributions shift back and forth between 
taxpayers and graduates, with the current distribution not too far from an even split.  
With so much political attention focussed on the impact of changes to higher education funding, 
developments in further education have been somewhat overshadowed. Over successive years, 
governments have been far less generous to this element of the post-18 system. The Adult 
Education Budget will have fallen by over 50 per cent in real terms between 2010/11 and 2019/20, 
while a 2013/14 move to a higher education-style fee loan system has stimulated less study than 
expected. With apprenticeship starts also having fallen after the introduction of the apprenticeship 
levy in 2017, there is now serious concern over the capacity of the post-18 education system to 
deliver vocational and technical training. This has fuelled a perception that the opportunities 
available to school leavers not interested or able to proceed to bachelor’s degree study are 
underutilised due to inequitable funding and support.  
The recent decision of the Office for National Statistics to revise the way in which student loans 
appear in the national accounts creates additional complications for the government. From 
September 2019 the ‘fiscal illusion’ that allowed the value of student loans issued to bypass the 
budget deficit, despite most of them never being predicted to be paid back, will end. Instead, the 
share of student loans that is expected to never be repaid will count as an expenditure, immediately 
hitting the budget deficit. The current treatment of all interest accrued on student loans as budget 
revenue, regardless of whether it will be paid back, will also end. Despite there being no actual long-
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run cost difference, these changes fundamentally alter the incentives for government, putting grants 
on more favourable footing compared with the student loans that have fuelled spending growth 
across the post-18 system in recent years.  
The impending report from the Post-18 review will be a chance for the government to address many 
of these issues in a considered way. Since the review launched, EPI has engaged with the review 
panel, key stakeholders and the wider public to ensure there is an evidence-based diagnosis of the 
tertiary sector’s challenges, and that a robust and deliverable set of reforms are produced.  
This report is a product of our work thus far. In the following chapters we review several proposals 
to address key challenges for post-18 education, assessing the evidence for each.   
First, in chapter two we address the challenge of reshaping pathways for school leavers. Here we 
discuss the merits of introducing a UCAS tariff floor for bachelor’s degree entry to divert students 
who are unlikely to benefit from studying at this level into alternate pathways. We also analyse using 
variable tuition fees to nudge students towards applying for certain subjects and encouraging 
participation in further education by extending the maintenance loan system.  
In chapter three we look at how the decline in part-time and mature student numbers can be 
mitigated. We explore subsidising part-time students in order to lower tuition fees and providing 
further exemptions to student loan eligibility rules to provide more opportunities for retraining.  
Finally, chapter four explores potential changes to the overall student finance, maintenance and 
loan system. Policies to address student concerns are reviewed, from reintroducing maintenance 
grants and reducing lowering tuition fees. The implications of abolishing tuition fees altogether are 
also evaluated to provide a reference point for the Opposition’s key higher education policy.  
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2. Pathways for school leavers 
A persistent theme in the debate over the future of tertiary education in England has been disquiet 
over the perceived dominance of bachelor level study.1 This critique challenges the current tertiary 
funding system for having created a ‘bachelor or bust’ mentality among school leavers that has both 
devalued higher technical level learning, and led to many students pursuing bachelor qualifications 
in courses with poor labour market outcomes.  
In this chapter we assess several proposals to address these issues. The first, introducing a UCAS 
tariff floor, aims to address the issue of a small but growing number of students entering higher 
education with low levels of prior attainment, which raises questions over whether they are 
equipped to complete or benefit from their study. The second proposal is to adopt variable fees in 
the higher education system to steer students towards courses the government views as priorities 
for expansion. The third examines extending maintenance support to those undertaking further 
education qualifications in order to increase the share of young adults attaining at least a full level 3 
qualification.  
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UCAS tariff floor 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
A UCAS tariff point floor (henceforth ‘tariff floor’), which would restrict bachelor’s study entry to 
those with sufficiently high grades, has been put forward as a solution to two policy challenges. 
Firstly, it provides a means of constraining government spending on higher education while avoiding 
institution level student number caps. It also provides a way to prevent students from undertaking 
study at a level they may be unable to realise the benefits of. Both justifications were used when the 
2010 Browne review recommended a tariff floor for school leavers:  
We propose that entitlement to Student Finance is in the future determined by a minimum 
entry standard, based on aptitude. This will ensure that the system is responding to demand 
from those who are qualified to benefit from higher education. All students who meet the 
 In recent years the share of school leavers entering higher education with low levels of 
prior attainment has risen.  
 Applying a UCAS tariff floor to student finance access for bachelor’s degrees has been 
suggested as a means of both ensuring that entrants are able to adequately benefit and 
restraining growth in higher education expenditure.  
 Reports in the media have suggested that the government is exploring a tariff floor set 
at the level of three A level D grades or equivalent. Such a policy would only affect a 
small number of school leavers at present; its main effect would be to limit the scope of 
future expansion in provision. However, any impact would disproportionately affect 
those from less advantaged socio-economic backgrounds and certain ethnic groups. 
 School leavers entering bachelor’s degrees with low prior attainment experience worse 
completion and labour market outcomes than peers with high prior attainment. 
However, many still leave with good degree outcomes and research has not yet 
confirmed that such students would be better off pursuing alternative education or 
training pathways.  
 The government should not commit to a tariff floor without robust evidence that a 
significant majority of those affected would be better off pursuing alternative education 
or training pathways. 
 If research does find that such pathways exist, the government must ensure they are 
well sign-posted and resourced to accommodate any pupils who would be affected by 
this policy. Moreover, any savings should be recycled into earlier education phases to 
raise the attainment of those from less advantaged backgrounds to address gaps in 
access to bachelor’s degrees. 
 While this research is being carried out the government should continue to monitor the 
impact of the Office for Students in regulating entry standards and protecting the 
interests of students.   
16 
standard will have an entitlement to Student Finance and can take that entitlement to any 
institution that decides to offer them a place.2 
While the Browne review’s emphasis on calculating a tariff floor by reference to a fixed higher 
education budget is no longer applicable in an uncapped system, the personal and taxpayer returns 
to investment in higher education remain a concern. After all, there is significant evidence that 
students starting bachelor’s degrees with lower levels of prior achievement do not on average enjoy 
the same completion, academic attainment and earnings returns as their higher prior attaining 
peers. If these students are insufficiently benefitting from entry to a bachelor’s degree and the gains 
for such students could be matched or improved by undertaking an alternative training pathway, 
then a tariff floor for bachelor’s study may be worth implementing.  
Assessing bachelor’s degree outcomes with reference to prior attainment does pose a challenge, as 
the accuracy of UCAS tariff points as a proxy for prior or future attainment is weak. Under both the 
pre-2017 and current system, BTEC and other vocational qualification grades are converted to tariff 
points on the same basis as A level grades. For example, an A level student receiving A*A*A* will get 
the same number of tariff points as a D*D*D* BTEC Extended Diploma student. However, analysis by 
Cambridge Assessment shows that when equivalising tariff points on the basis of academic success 
in higher education, the aforementioned BTEC grades are equivalent to a CCC at A level.3 Separate 
analysis from the Fischer Family Trust equivalising on the basis of prior GCSE attainment arrives at a 
similar conclusion.4 As such, we assess student outcomes by qualification and grade rather than 
tariff points.i 
With respect to retention, those entering with BTEC qualifications are much more likely to drop out 
in their first year of study (see Figure 2.1; note sample includes all ages). While these students are 
more likely to be older learners, who have a higher risk of dropout, when looking at 18-year-old 
entrants alone those with a level 3 BTEC have a 13.8 per cent chance of dropout relative to 2.9 per 
cent chance for those with three A levels.5 When measured over a three-year period, full-time 
students (again, of all ages) who enter with a BTEC qualification (with or without other 
qualifications) had a 68 per cent chance of completing their course relative to 92 per cent for those 
with an A level background in 2012/13 (the last year for which analysis has been published).6 Though 
this is notably lower it does show that the vast majority of students with BTEC qualifications do go 
on to complete their studies.   
  
                                                          
i Unless otherwise stated, outcomes are calculated based on UK domiciled bachelor’s degree students under 
21 years of age at entry attending UK institutions. Entry qualifications refer to those who entered only with the 
qualification noted (e.g. only BTEC) unless otherwise stated. We focus on outcomes for level 3 BTEC students, 
as they are the most common vocational qualification used to gain entry to higher education.  
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Figure 2.1: First year dropout by entry qualification (2015/16 FT bachelor entrants, all ages)  
 
Source: OfS 
For students who do complete their studies, those entering with a BTEC triple merit or below have 
less than a 50 per cent chance of achieving a first or upper-second (see Figure 2.2). Whilst this is 
significantly lower than those with higher entry grades, it is notable that so many of these students 
get a good degree outcome. Furthermore, it’s likely that the majority of graduates with even these 
relatively low entry grades would achieve at least a second-class degree. 
Figure 2.2: Share of graduates gaining a first or upper second-class degree by entry qualifications (2016/17 
graduates) 
 
Source: HEFCE 
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There is also significant evidence that prior attainment heavily influences returns to bachelor’s 
degree study, with lower attainers seeing significantly smaller post-graduation incomes.7  
Policy detail 
No detailed plan for how a tariff floor would function has been provided, but assuming the primary 
purpose would be to avoid enrolling students who are unlikely to fully benefit from bachelor study, 
broad parameters can be sketched out.  
First, applying a tariff floor could only be done by limiting access to student finance, as higher 
education providers retain autonomy over admissions. This means that those with the financial 
means to pay upfront could still circumvent the floor and access higher education. However, they 
would be doing so in full knowledge that they face lower average earnings returns. 
The Association of Colleges (AoC) suggestion of only applying a tariff floor to applicants aged under 
21 makes sense, as those over this age should receive recognition of post-school experience. To 
avoid cutting off avenues for progression, students completing level 5 qualifications would likely be 
permitted to access a top-up bachelor’s degree year without reference to the tariff floor. An 
exemption to a tariff floor may also be required for certain courses where entry is predominantly 
determined by portfolio or interview assessment.  
Turning to identifying an appropriate tariff floor level, there are several ways to determine this. A 
crude method would be to set the floor at the level required to achieve a pre-determined saving to 
the government budget. While this could yield significant budget savings, setting a tariff floor in such 
a way would risk cutting student numbers dramatically for the false economy of current budget 
savings over longer-term human capital investment. A more sophisticated method would be to set a 
tariff floor with reference to a minimum acceptable likelihood of degree completion and post-
completion labour market outcomes.  
Doing so is possible. As part of a widening participation agenda, higher education providers in 
Scotland are already working to calculate the ‘minimum academic standard’ that a student would 
need to meet to successfully complete a degree programme.8 This is analogous to the Browne 
review’s rationale of setting a tariff floor at a level where entrants would be ‘qualified to benefit’ 
from their study. This might imply permitting access to students so long as entering a bachelor’s 
degree programme provides a larger earnings premium than that enjoyed by those with the same 
prior attainment entering other qualifications (e.g. level 4 or 5 apprenticeships or sub-bachelor 
study). Crucially, any comparison of earnings should be based on entrants, not graduates, so as to 
factor in the erosion of any earnings premium by non-completion.  
In terms of the number of students affected, that would depend on the precise tariff floor. On 16 
December 2018 The Times reported that the Post-18 review panel was considering a tariff floor at 
DDD grade for A level students, which would prevent those with grades below from accessing 
student finance. This grade is equivalent to a DDM floor for BTEC entrants.ii Available data from 
UCAS on higher education acceptances among English students aged 18 shows that a tariff floor at 
                                                          
ii Calculated using the BTEC to A level tariff equivalencies estimated by Cambridge Assessment, which adjust 
for academic success in higher education. 
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this level would affect a relatively small number (see Table 2.1).iii Note this table contains higher 
education entrants, not only bachelor’s degree entrants, so the numbers affected would likely be 
smaller still given lower tariff students are more likely to enter sub-bachelor qualifications (e.g. 
Foundation degrees). That said, the proportion of higher education entrants with attainment levels 
under the proposed threshold is likely much higher for those starting at ages 19-21. UCAS data is 
unfortunately not publicly available to assess these numbers beyond age 18.  
Table 2.1: 2017 higher education acceptances, England domiciled 18-year-olds with at least 3 A levels or a 
level 3 BTEC equivalent to 3 A levels (applications received before June deadline) 
 Grade 
Number of 
acceptances 
Cumulative proportion relative to 
total acceptances for 18-year 
olds (from lowest to highest 
grade) 
A level 
EEE 165 0.08% 
DEE 725 0.43% 
DDE 2,080 1.43% 
DDD (reported threshold for 
student finance eligibility) 4,125 3.41% 
 
BTEC 
PPP 365 0.18% 
MPP 522 0.43% 
MMP 725 0.77% 
MMM 1,100 1.30% 
DMM 1,750 2.14% 
DDM (reported threshold for 
student finance eligibility) 2,205 3.20% 
Source: UCAS 
Though a tariff floor set at the level reported by The Times would have a limited impact on the size 
of the school leaver cohort presently entering bachelor study, it would protect against an erosion of 
entry standards going forward. This is a compelling consideration, as the decline in school-leaver 
cohort size is set to continue until 2020/21, providing ample incentive for providers to lower entry 
standards in an effort to retain student intake.  
Universities UK’s analysis of UCAS tariff point averages across the sector suggests a deterioration in 
entry standards has not occurred over the past decade. However, this is likely a result of the 
aforementioned over-allocation of tariff points to BTEC and other vocational qualifications, whose 
numbers have increased the most in recent years.9 Looking at A level pupils alone, there is clear 
                                                          
iii Note that this table does not distinguish between bachelor’s degree and other higher education acceptances, 
so acceptances of the former are a subset of the numbers shown.  
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evidence of a rapid rise in offer rates for lower grade applicants (see Figure 2.3). If BTEC entrants had 
their tariff points awarded on the equivalised basis advanced by Cambridge Assessment or FFT, no 
doubt a decline in entry standards would be uncovered.  
Figure 2.3: Offer rate by predicted A level grades for English 18-year-old applicants with at least 3 A levels 
 
Source: UCAS 
It would be vital to the success of a tariff floor policy that students unable to access bachelor’s 
degrees as a result were provided with access and sign-posting to the pathways the government 
identified as delivering comparable returns.  
Criticism 
A tariff floor has been criticised on the basis that it would hamper progress in widening participation 
and represent a back-door reintroduction of student number caps.10  
There is no doubt that a tariff floor would have a greater proportional impact on students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds given they exit school with lower attainment levels. In 2018, A level 
students entering higher education with grades at DDE or below numbered 445 among the lowest 
participation-area group (POLAR3) quintile and 820 among the highest quintile. While in absolute 
terms this means a bigger impact on more advantaged learners, the 445 make up 3.5 per cent of all 
entrants from the lowest POLAR3 quintile, while the 820 account for just 1.5 per cent of entrants 
from the highest quintile.11 While not a huge difference, the change would set back widening 
participation in higher education at a time when the government and all political parties are intent 
on increasing it.   
However, if a tariff floor was designed only to deny student finance for bachelor’s study to those 
who would be much more likely to attain a similar or better earnings return through an alternative 
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pathway, objections to the policy on social mobility grounds would be a misplaced concern. It is 
unclear how enrolling students into bachelor’s degrees, where on average they would not see an 
earnings benefit, contributes meaningfully to social mobility or count as a victory for widening 
participation. If these students are likely to see similar or higher earnings from pursuing alternative 
education and training pathways, then a policy that pushes them to do so is more likely to support a 
broader definition of social mobility. Furthermore, if social mobility is the goal, a more effective 
policy would be to provide greater support during earlier education phases to raise the attainment 
of disadvantaged and low participation groups, in order to put more of them above any tariff floor in 
the first place.   
A tariff floor would also differ from the restoration of student number caps, as there would be no 
institution level quota setting from central government. There would only be a threshold level of 
academic attainment required of those accessing student finance for bachelor’s degree 
programmes. The more that reached this threshold, the higher the number that would be 
supported.  
The strongest criticism of the proposal concerns whether those who would be affected really do see 
little to no income boost from bachelor’s degree study. While their returns are certainly lower than 
those with higher levels of prior attainment, the crucial question concerns the counterfactual: would 
they be better off pursuing a training or education pathway other than bachelor’s degree study?  
The evidence base here is still far from concrete, though recent research from the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS) shines some light on this question. Whilst it does not distinguish between bachelor and 
sub-bachelor level study, it shows that relative to non-entrants, male higher education entrants in 
the bottom third of GCSE attainment without a STEM A level saw earnings at age 29 that were just 4 
per cent higher. This compares to 8 and 20 per cent for entrants in the middle and top third of GCSE 
attainment respectively. 12 For women with the same academic background, earnings were 23 per 
cent higher relative to 25 and 31 per cent for the middle and top third of attainers. Though the IFS 
noted that for women the counterfactual group was likely to be comprised of a disproportionally 
high share of part-time employed (and thus lower annual income) individuals, inflating the 
estimated return by a considerable but unknown amount. If the earning premium observed for low 
attaining men, which does not have the confounding effect of a far greater rate of part-time work in 
the counterfactual group, is representative of the return to commencing higher education study for 
school leavers, this suggests a positive but small benefit to earnings. Labour Force Survey data shows 
that higher education graduates see faster earnings growth through their 30s, so low attainers might 
benefit further from entering higher education, presuming they experience this faster rate of 
earnings growth at the same rate as the average graduate.  
However, as the IFS by necessity base their estimates on cohorts who took GCSEs between 2002 and 
2007, these results may no longer reflect returns for low attainers given the share of school leavers 
entering higher education has grown by almost 10 percentage points since 2007.13 With more low 
attaining school leavers entering higher education today, particularly with BTEC qualifications, the 4 
per cent income premium at age 29 may now be an overestimate.   
Focussing on bachelor’s degrees specifically, a study from the Department for Education (DfE) which 
looked at school leavers found that for students drawn from the middle third of the GCSE 
attainment distribution, completing a level 4 or 5 qualification provides only a slightly smaller return 
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at age 25 than a bachelor’s degree.14, iv This is in contrast to the highest and lowest attaining third of 
GCSE students, who see far larger gains from studying at bachelor level than at 4 or 5. Unlike the 
prior IFS study however, the DfE report returns on the basis of qualification holders rather than 
entrants, which complicates interpretation of the results, as non-completion is not accounted for. 
These studies show that entering higher education and bachelor’s degrees can yield benefits for 
students with lower levels of prior attainment. However, these studies have not conclusively showed 
that those school leavers likely to be affected by a tariff floor who enter apprenticeships, sub-
bachelor or further education study at levels 4 or 5 will see a comparable return to bachelor’s 
degree study.v  
In any case, up-front government funding for further education study at level 4 and 5 remains well 
below that of a bachelor’s degree; with annual funding limits for qualifications with comparable 
annual teaching intensity ranging from £4,170 to £7,172, well below the £9,250 for a bachelor’s 
degree.15 Whilst funding levels for these qualifications remain low by comparison, and recognition 
by employers is patchy at best, young people who do not exceed the tariff floor may not actually 
take up these alternative pathways.  
Finally, with the formation of the Office for Students (OfS) as the new higher education sector 
regulator, their tougher quality assurance and monitoring framework may be enough to address this 
issue without resorting to an across-the-board tariff floor. The new Quality Code designed by the 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), the OfS’s standards assessor, expects providers to ensure all 
students are supported to succeed in and benefit from their qualification without lowering 
standards.16 If the QAA and OfS can properly hold institutions to account over these rules, the 
perceived need for a tariff floor will evaporate.  
Conclusion 
Imposing a UCAS tariff points floor for access to bachelor’s degree student loans in the years 
immediately following secondary school could assist in deterring less qualified students from 
enrolling into study that may not improve their labour market outcomes. However, as the majority 
of the students who might be affected by such a floor appear to achieve good degree outcomes, 
further research is required to show that entering such students onto bachelor’s degree is less 
beneficial for them than alternative study at lower levels. If research were to find a range of prior 
attainment levels for which level 4 or 5 training did match or even surpass bachelor’s degree 
earnings returns for a significant majority of students, the government could feel more confident in 
implementing a tariff floor.  
Implementing a tariff floor without this evidence would risk pushing disproportionally disadvantaged 
school leavers into education and training pathways that hamper their future earnings. While doing 
                                                          
iv The DfE study of GCSE attainment distributions is not comparable with those of the IFS due to the former 
including all students who took GCSEs unconditional on receiving five passes, while the latter restricted to 
those who had achieved at least 5 GCSE passes. This means that the bottom and middle third of students in 
the DfE study would have been found among the bottom third in the IFS study. The DfE study also reports 
returns to qualification holders rather than entrants.  
v Research into this point would need to be conducted as per the IFS’s work, but decompose post-school 
routes in a more granular manner than using a higher education entry as a binary.  
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so could deliver a budget saving, and might be pursued for that purpose alone, it could potentially 
lower productivity levels and future tax revenue.  
If research justified a tariff floor, the government would need to ensure adequate funding and sign 
posting of the alternative pathways that offered comparable earnings returns before 
implementation. Moreover, given that the tariff floor would disproportionally impact low 
participation groups, any savings from the introduction of a floor should be redirected to raising the 
attainment of these groups in earlier education phases.    
As part of research into the merits of a tariff floor, revisiting the allocation of UCAS tariff points to 
vocational qualifications such as BTECs should also occur, with a view to bringing their value into line 
with points awarded to A level students who experience similar non-completion and academic 
success outcomes. Otherwise students may switch to qualifications that might put them above the 
floor but might not otherwise support their progression through higher education and into the 
labour market.  
In the meantime, the government should continue to monitor entry standards and outcomes for low 
prior attainment school leavers, as the OfS’s revised regulatory framework may address this issue.   
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Variable fees 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
When discussing the impending launch of the Post-18 review, Education Secretary Damian Hinds 
pointed out that nearly all institutions now charge the maximum permitted student fee. This was not 
the intention of the 2012 student finance reforms, which anticipated a competitive market where 
institutions charged a range of fees. 17 Hinds went on to muse that student fees ought to be 
determined by ‘a combination of three things: the cost [to the university] to put it on, the benefit to 
the student and the benefit to our country and our economy’.18  
Creating multiple subject-based fee bands on the basis of delivery cost, private benefit, and public 
benefit could allow the government to simultaneously:  
 Influence student demand: by setting student fees with reference to current or predicted 
labour market demands, social benefit, or by reference to earnings returns, the government 
could pursue its Industrial Strategy objectives, limit outlays for subjects where graduates are 
less likely to make repayments and increase supply in professions which are currently 
experiencing recruitment challenges.  
 Increase system progressivity: this could be achieved by mandating higher fees for courses 
that on average result in higher graduate earnings (and vice versa for low return courses). 
 Reduce taxpayer contributions to higher education funding: varying fees could also allow the 
government to reduce outlays in a number of ways. Higher delivery cost subjects could have 
fees increased (and grants reduced) so that students contribute a greater share of funding. 
Lower delivery cost subjects could have fees reduced without a compensating increase in 
grants (addressing potential overfunding).  
  
 An enduring criticism of the 2012 student finance reform is the failure to stimulate price 
competition among higher education providers.  
 Regulating to impose variable fee caps on the basis of subject or provider-level graduate 
outcomes has been suggested as a means to steer students towards certain in-demand 
qualifications, while ensuring high earning graduates contribute more for their study 
and high-provision costs are accounted for in fee levels.  
 Several nations do set different fees on a subject-by-subject basis, but there is no clear 
means of balancing the competing objectives proponents cite as reasons for variable 
pricing.  
 The government should rule out creating a variable fee system that aims to address 
several objectives. Evidence and theory suggest that varying fees on a subject cost basis 
can be done without creating unintended side-effects on student demand. However, if 
the goal is to lower overall outlays, lowering the overall fee cap and adjusting teaching 
grant levels is a less contentious approach to achieving this.  
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Policy detail 
The government would need to decide how much to weight each of the three potential 
considerations (provision cost, private returns, and public returns) when calculating fee bands. 
Though England would not be the first nation to attempt to create such a system. Australia has long 
operated a system of fee bands by subject, and several EU nations charge (significantly smaller) fees 
on the basis of one of these factors.19 , 20 Many UK universities also charge fees that vary by subject 
to non-EU international students, though these decisions are made under a more commercial basis 
linked to ‘what the market will bear’, given many international students will not have access to an 
income contingent loan.  
The net impact on both graduates and taxpayers is dependent on the goals and structure of any 
tiered fee system. Both savings or additional spending possible depend on the direction and 
magnitude of movement away from the current fee cap, and on what shifts in student demand and 
institution provision occur as a result. Table 2.2 illustrates the subject fee setting options available 
given the goals outlined by the education secretary, and illustrates the relative direction each would 
push fees for several subjects.  
Table 2.2: Goals, conduits, and implied fee setting decisions under if varying fees by subject 
Goal Fee setting options available  
Implied direction of fee change: 
Economics Creative arts Nursing 
Reduce 
taxpayer 
contributions 
(provision 
cost)  
Lower grant outlays: Increase fee 
cap and lower teaching grant for 
higher delivery cost subjects. 
N/A N/A ↑ 
Lower loan outlays: Lower fee 
cap with no offsetting increase in 
teaching grant for low delivery 
cost subjects, where there is 
more evidence of over-funding.  
↓ ↓ N/A 
Raise repayments: Increase fee 
cap and lower teaching grant for 
high-return subjects.  
↑ N/A N/A 
Increase 
system 
progressivity 
(private 
benefit)  
Redistribute burden of 
repayments: Increase fees for 
high return subjects, and lower 
fees for low return subjects.  
↑ ↓ N/A 
Meet labour 
market needs 
(public 
benefit) 
Set subject fees to attract 
students into courses on the basis 
of labour market shortages. 
N/A ↑ ↓ 
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Another option for the government is to cap fees on an institution or both an institution and subject 
basis. This would imply differentiating on the basis of private returns, which is now possible thanks 
to newly available matched education and income tax data. 
Criticism 
A variable fee system would appear to contribute to many government objectives, but establishing a 
system that meets any more than one presents a serious challenge, as shown by the competing fee 
setting decisions in Table 2.3. Ultimately any subject fee bands arrived at would largely be a product 
of the weighting afforded to various objectives. If there were a clear hierarchy of widely agreed 
priorities this might be simple for the government to design, but in reality such decisions would be 
highly contentious and likely subject to frequent changes.   
Some of these contradictions have been noted in the income contingent loan system Australia 
operates. Multiple fee bands have existed since 1988. These were originally based on provision cost 
estimates but over time considerations including labour market needs have been factored in.21 A 
succession of government reviews have questioned the operation of this tiered fee model, from the 
2008 Bradley review finding ‘the range of [student fees] has no strong policy or empirical basis,’ to 
the 2011 Lomax-Smith review declaring ‘the current pattern of student contributions appears to 
have developed incrementally without a consistent underlying rationale’.22, 23  
The Bradley review considered several options to reform the variable fee model but ultimately 
concluded that there was ‘no easy basis on which to determine the ‘right’ mix of public and private 
contributions.’ The Lomax-Smith review did put forward recommendations for change, which lead to 
the government ceasing to use labour market shortages as a consideration when setting subject fee 
bands. This was largely due to a paucity of evidence of any relationship between fee changes and 
student demand. The review also attempted to sketch out a compelling rationale for setting variable 
fees based on a consistent principle (graduates to meet 40 per cent of total delivery cost), but the 
government ignored this suggestion due to the ‘contentious debates’ it would spark.24  
Even with three decades of operating and periodically reviewing a variable fee system, lasting 
agreement on exactly how to balance competing considerations in allocating subjects to fee tiers has 
been elusive in Australia.  
An alternative for the government is to set fees on the basis of just one objective.  
Pricing subjects to account for private returns is not advised as the variability of earnings returns 
across subjects is very high, which estimates of mean post-graduation earnings mask. For instance, 
at an average annual salary of £37,500, economics is the second highest remunerated degree 
subject five years after graduation, but this mean must be considered alongside the significant 
variation in return (£25,000 separates the bottom and top quartiles).25 Given the income contingent 
loan system already extracts greater repayments from higher earners, the rationale for adopting 
variable fees to extract further payments is weak. 
As noted by the Lomax-Smith review, setting subject fees with the intention of shifting student 
demand towards subjects with labour market shortages or high public benefits has limited evidence 
in its favour. When Australia cut fees for maths and science subjects in 2009 by over 40 per cent, 
taking them from mid-priced courses to the lowest price band, applications ceased falling and 
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instead leapt by 17 per cent and then continued to grow year-on-year. However, this experience 
appears to have been an outlier.26 On other occasions: 
 When fees for a select range of subjects more than doubled in 1997, there was no material 
change in student demand for these subjects relative to others.27 
 When nursing and education fees were shifted into a newly created ultra-low fee band in 
2005 there was ‘limited effect’ on student demand for both subjects. Counter intuitively, 
when fees for both subjects were then restored back to their original, higher, fee band, 
nursing applications surged and the long decline in education applications steadied.28 
 When in 2013 the government reversed the 2009 decision on lowering maths and science 
fees, moving them from the lowest to the middle fee band, no change in application growth 
rates was observed.29 
The unresponsiveness of student demand is to be expected in an income contingent loan backed 
system: selecting a subject or institution on the basis of it charging a lower fee is usually irrational. 
There is little reason to consider selecting on price rather than quality unless the amount saved is 
very large and liable to lower future repayments without simultaneously impairing job prospects.  
For many students it is likely that their own interests, academic aptitude, and mix of subjects 
previously studied will be key factors in deciding on a subject to study in higher education. As a 
result, student demand is likely more responsive to relative price changes to subjects within the 
same broad domain. For example, an increase in engineering course fees may drive more students 
into the physical sciences rather than creative arts.30  
Collectively these issues suggest that attempting to steer student demand by varying fees is difficult 
unless very large differentials in price are created. Policies to encourage take-up of Key Stage 4 and 5 
subjects relevant to pursuing study in particular fields may stand a better chance of increasing 
student demand for related higher education courses. 
Pricing subjects on delivery cost is the most compelling basis, as the relatively low price elasticity 
detailed earlier should allow student fees to be varied without inadvertently deterring students from 
higher cost subjects that are experiencing labour market shortages e.g. nursing and medicine. Here 
the government could tweak existing fee levels with a view to minimising outlays or raising 
repayments. Alternatively they could set student fees to account for a consistent share of total 
delivery cost, which varies considerably by subject. However, the Australian example shows 
achieving lasting consensus by varying fees in this way is difficult; a uniform rule  will strike many as 
unfair due to higher fees for courses like nursing.  
If the objective is to correctly resource subjects based on average delivery costs, a uniform fee set at 
the lowest subject cost with top-up teaching grants for higher cost subjects is a solution that 
achieves this without risking any inadvertent, if unlikely, shift in student preferences. If some 
subjects have delivery costs significantly below the current student fee cap, this would also allow the 
government to make a saving by reducing the overall quantum of funding.  
Finally, as noted by MillionPlus in their submission to the Post-18 review, setting fees by institution 
level returns is unpalatable as family background is a major determinant of earnings even a decade 
after graduation.31 For institutions in more deprived areas, taking on local students and assisting 
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graduates to find jobs locally rather than in London would see their funding decline. For this reason, 
former Universities Minister David Willetts pointed out that such a policy would act as a ‘reverse 
pupil premium’.32  
Conclusion 
While superficially attractive, a subject level variable fee system that seeks to meet a variety of 
policy objectives will struggle to arrive at coherent price bands. Evidence from Australia also 
suggests that attempting to influence student demand to meet labour market needs is unlikely to 
work. Pricing fees on the basis of private returns alone, either on a subject or institution basis, is 
unpalatable due to the wide variation in earnings returns across both dimensions, and the lower rate 
of funding it would provide institutions that serve less advantaged communities.  
Only pricing subjects with a view to better reflect delivery costs while reducing the burden on 
taxpayers has some merit. However, any fee differentials created in moving to this system would 
have to be relatively small so as not to risk inadvertently shifting student demand.  
The government should reject creating a variable fee system on any basis other than subject delivery 
cost. It should recognise that alternative changes, like uniformly lowering fees and then selectively 
raising teaching grants to reduce overall outlays, may be a less contentious way of lowering overall 
outlays by better matching total subject funding to estimated delivery cost. 
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Maintenance support for further education 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
Many submissions to the Post-18 review raised the importance of reinvigorating further education 
pathways, with the AoC suggesting the government do so by revising maintenance support 
arrangements. vi, 33 Currently, further education qualifications do not attract any guaranteed 
maintenance support as higher education programmes of study do. While Further Education 
Colleges and other providers are funded to make support grants to learners in particular 
circumstances (i.e. financial hardship), these are not intended to be a sole source of income. Indeed, 
their average value was just £463 per supported learner in 2010/11.34  
No doubt part of the reason that the maintenance support that is offered to higher education 
students is are not extended to students in further education is that they more often study on a 
part-time basis, with more students in sustained employment, and studying with the support of their 
employer. However, with part-time higher education students set to receive maintenance loans 
from the 2018/19 academic year, the sector divide has become starker.  
The government has also already committed to extending maintenance loans to those studying level 
4 and 5 qualifications at National Colleges and Institutes of Technology by 2020/21. However, with 
no Institutes of Technology open yet, and only four National Colleges in operation, at present this 
would cover only a very small share of the further education student community.  
There is reason to suspect many potential students are unable to study due to constraints that an 
extended maintenance support system might resolve. Financial and time barriers are listed as key 
reasons when adults are surveyed as to why they are not pursuing further study.35 This is particularly 
true for those aged 19-23.36, 37  
The higher incomes that come with qualifying to level 3 and above are another reason to consider 
funding measures to raise participation. A variety of studies have made it clear that there are 
substantial salary returns to gaining additional full qualifications, particularly at full level 3 and 
above.38, 39, 40, 41 For instance, in 2010 London Economics found attaining a level 3 BTEC has a net 
present value of between £59,000 and £92,000 relative to a level 2. Furthermore, they noted the 
                                                          
vi Note that we use ‘Further Education’ to refer to qualifications eligible for ESFA funding or Advanced Learner 
Loans.  
 Unlike higher education students, adults pursuing further education qualifications are 
not entitled to maintenance support in either loan or grant form. 
 Introducing maintenance loans for further education study would address this inequity 
and facilitate more adults to enter training, which at level 3 and above provides a 
substantial income premium.  
 The government should offer maintenance loans to young adults pursuing a first full 
level 3 qualification, which would come at a modest cost. This group at present receive 
free tuition, but financial and time barriers prevent many from taking advantage of this.  
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benefits to the Exchequer (arising from higher tax receipts) are also quite large, in the range of 
£35,000 to £54,000.42 The Confederation of British Industry’s 2018 survey of employers also found 
strong demand for more employees trained at levels 3 to 5.43  
Beyond extending maintenance loans to further education as a means of raising participation and 
thus earnings, there is also an argument that the present system represents an inequality that serves 
to diminish the status of further education. When consulted about maintenance support extension 
in 2016, many further education institutions and bodies expressed the view that extending 
maintenance loans would help address the perception of vocational and technical learning as being 
less important than higher education study.44  
Policy detail 
Little concrete detail has been provided about how the government might implement a maintenance 
loan system for further education students.  
The AoC has suggested that the government extend maintenance loans to level 4 and 5 students of 
all ages and all institutions, on the same terms as provided in higher education. They have also 
suggested that up to age 24, level 3 qualifications be supported with maintenance loans.45  
Mark Corney, a further education consultant, has suggested a more modest extension of 
maintenance support be adopted, with loans extended to 19-23 year-olds undertaking a first full 
level 3 qualification, or more narrowly undertaking a T-level qualification (once T-levels have been 
rolled out).46, 47 The logic to this proposal is that for 19-23 year-olds, a first full level 3 is already 
offered free of charge, so it is inconsistent to not offer any means of meeting living costs while 
studying for this qualification. Limiting by age also makes fiscal sense, as qualifications obtained prior 
to age 25 confer a larger earnings premium, reducing the overall cost to government.48  
EPI estimates that the annual cash outlay required to provide a maintenance loan on higher 
education terms to 19-23 year-olds entitled to a free first full level 3 qualification is at least £205 
million. This is the cost of providing maintenance loans to the approximately 30,000 that would have 
undertaken study without any policy change. The outlay per additional learner induced to study as a 
result of this change is approximately £16,000, taking into account both maintenance loan and 
tuition provision. The total outlay depends on how many additional learners would be incentivised 
to commence study as a result (see Table 2.3 for estimates). 
Table 2.3: Estimated outlay required to provide maintenance loans to 19-23 year-olds on first full level 3 
qualification 
Number of additional learners induced to study  Outlay required (£m) 
0 205 
1,000 221 
2,000 237 
5,000 284 
8,000 331 
10,000 363 
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Criticism 
There has been little public debate about this proposal, but any hesitation the government has 
about this idea will centre on cost. Limiting maintenance loans to those aged 19-23 pursuing a first 
full level 3 would result in a total outlay between £205 and £360 million, depending on take-up and 
induced demand assumptions.49 The actual cost to government, factoring in loan repayments, is 
likely to be close to this number as the current RAB charge on level 3 Advanced Learner Loans is 55 
per cent. These have an average value of just £1,350 while the average higher education 
maintenance loan value is £5,490.50, 51, 52  
Another consideration in evaluating this expenditure is the extent to which the measure succeeds in 
inducing additional young adults to study. Though many in this age range cite financial 
considerations as a key barrier to study, there are others that maintenance support does not 
address. These include lack of confidence stemming from negative experiences with education, 
challenges navigating courses on offer and difficulties in finding learning opportunities that fit 
around employment, caring, and other responsibilities. Debt aversion among prospective learners 
may also suppress take-up.  
If few commence study as a result of extending maintenance loans, there would be a significant 
deadweight spend due to the cost of providing maintenance loans to those who would have 
undertaken study regardless. A well-funded and targeted advertising campaign to alert young 
people to this entitlement would be necessary to ensure a sufficient volume of additional learners 
result.  
Conclusion 
Extending the maintenance loan system to cover a first full level 3 qualification for 19-23 year-olds 
would fix an inequity that sees higher attainers given support to gain qualifications in the higher 
education system while those who exit school with a level 2 qualification are denied support. While 
the extent to which the policy will boost the number of young people educated to level 3 standard is 
hard to estimate, and somewhat reliant on the extent to which government would fund marketing 
of the maintenance loan entitlement, the high proportion of potential learners who cite financial 
constraints as a barrier suggests it would have a material impact on participation.  
The cost of this policy is relatively modest, in the vicinity of the cost of restoring maintenance grants 
to higher education students. While the amount recouped by the government would likely be 
relatively low presuming the repayment parameters of the higher education loan system were used, 
the Exchequer would still capture substantial benefits through higher income tax payments over a 
lifetime. Importantly, those studying as a result of this policy would benefit from a substantial 
earnings premium after completion.  
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3. Part-time and mature student study 
The government is under significant pressure to address the continuing fall in part-time and mature 
student numbers in England.vii Though in the past these learners have featured less prominently in 
discussions over the future of higher education, the sheer scale of the decline has brought the issue 
to national attention and saw it mentioned directly by Theresa May in her speech launching the 
Post-18 review. 
All UK nations have experienced a protracted decline in part-time student numbers since at least 
2010, with the largest drops seen in Wales (46 per cent fall) and England (63 per cent). The shared 
trend suggests the fall in English part-time numbers is not solely attributable to the higher tuition 
fees imposed from 2012, though researchers from The Sutton Trust have estimated this may be 
responsible for 40 per cent of the overall fall in England.53   
Significant policy changes will be necessary to halt the decline. However, a return to pre-2010 
numbers may neither be possible or desirable given some part-time study appears to have shifted 
into forms of provision that are not counted in official statistics, including non-credit bearing 
modules, study in alternative provider settings, and online learning via Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs).54 The government’s primary response thus far has been an extension of maintenance loan 
access to part-time students from 2018/19. 
In the following section we will review two frequently discussed changes that aim to arrest the 
decline in part-time and mature study. The first attempts to address the greater degree of debt 
aversion and price sensitivity seen among prospective part-time and mature learners, while the 
second involves easing a funding eligibility restriction that inhibits reskilling of older learners who 
already possess higher education qualifications.  
  
                                                          
vii Note that this chapter will detail statistics that in most instances correspond to part-time or mature learners 
specifically. However, as 90 per cent of part-time students are mature (over 21 years of age), most descriptive 
statistics and policy solutions are relevant to both groups. 
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Reducing part-time tuition fees  
Summary  
 
Rationale and background 
The steep fall in part-time student numbers following the 2012 fee increase has led many to 
conclude that a revival (or at least a reduction in decline) depends on lowering tuition fees.55, 56, 57 
This is a departure from the prevailing view which animated the Browne review and the Coalition 
government’s response to it, that the full-time and part-time student finance arrangements needed 
to be aligned.58, 59 The key change in 2012 for part-time students was a new entitlement to tuition 
fee loans, which had previously been accessible only to full-time students. However, two issues 
appear to have prevented the increase in part-time numbers that was expected as a result.  
First, there was a failure to predict how part-time fees would change. The Coalition had estimated 
that due to loan eligibility rules concerning study intensity, Equivalent and Lower Qualification (ELQ) 
and other conditions, 30 per cent of part-time students would be entitled to a loan, which left most 
needing to pay the full cost of study up front. Though the government impact assessment noted 
there was a ‘risk’ fees would rise for part-time students not eligible for loans, it took the view that it 
was ‘impossible to predict and/or quantify the likelihood and the impact of this happening’.60 As it 
happens, the average full-time equivalent (FTE) fee for part-time students rose from £2,140 in 
2007/08 to £6,500 in 2017/18 (both in 2017/18 prices).61, 62 With two-thirds of prospective part-time 
students not entitled to a student loan to cover their tuition fees, the decline would appear to be an 
inevitable response.  
Beyond the small number of prospective part-time students eligible for loans, there is a further issue 
of debt aversion among those who are eligible. Government commissioned research into the 
attitudes of part-time students towards tuition debt found they were highly debt averse, likely on 
 High tuition fee levels since 2012 have contributed to a large decline in part-time and 
mature student numbers due to this population’s higher level of price sensitivity and 
debt aversion.  
 Reducing tuition fees by providing a part-time teaching grant has been proposed as a 
means of encouraging more prospective part-time and mature students into study. 
 A £1,000 part-time teaching grant per full-time equivalent student would cost £251 
million per cohort given current part-time numbers, with some offsetting savings from 
smaller student loan outlays. The total cost to the government would depend on the 
number of additional students entering higher education study as a result. 
 Relative to lowering tuition fees for all students, a grant for part-time students is a more 
targeted way to assist learners who are more likely to be from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  
 If full-time tuition fees are kept at current levels, the government should consider 
offering part-time teaching grants to reduce fees for this group. To contain costs, it may 
be appropriate to do so only for those eligible for student loans, on a means-tested 
basis, or for qualifications associated with strong labour market outcomes.  
34 
account of existing financial commitments (e.g. mortgages, childcare costs and family budget 
pressures).63 No doubt the high share of current and prospective part-time learners from 
disadvantaged backgrounds also feeds into a wariness of taking out student loans, even if the terms 
offered are advantageous.64 Indeed, analysis shows that only 24 per cent of new part-time entrants 
in 2012 took out a tuition fee loan, which equates to 59 per cent of those eligible.65  
This suggests the government’s move to make part-time students eligible for maintenance loans 
may have limited effect. Hence many concerned with this decline advocate for a tuition fee 
reduction offset by an increase in teaching grants for part-time students.  
A failure to counteract the fall is likely to setback the widening participation agenda, as part-time 
students are twice as likely to be from low-participation areas than full-time entrants.66 
Policy detail 
At present, only a small amount of direct funding (£72m in 2018/19) is earmarked for part-time 
students, specifically for retention initiatives.67 Previously, thanks to teaching grants for both full and 
part-time students, direct subsidies were much higher, which meant fees for part-time students 
were quite modest. Several proposals have been put forward to move the system somewhat closer 
to this prior state.  
One proposal that has the benefit of having been clearly specified and costed is to provide a £1,000 
teaching grant per FTE part-time student, linked to a reduction in tuition fees of the same amount.68 
London Economics finds that the additional grant expenditure of this policy would total £251m per 
cohort given current numbers of English domiciled part-time students.69 If part-time fees fell 
commensurately as intended, the long-run cost would be smaller as the government would not have 
seen all of the forfeited loan amounts paid back at any rate. However, the exact cost is difficult to 
predict given the fee grant would be available to 100 per cent of the part-time student cohort, yet 
the saving from smaller student loans would only come from the 24 per cent who take out tuition 
fee loans. Hence, the long-run reduction in unpaid debt would be a small share of the immediate 
grant expense. This is before factoring in the behavioural response this policy intends, which would 
predict a rise in part-time numbers, incurring both upfront and long-run costs.viii   
Note that the logic of this policy only applies to the current tuition fee system. If overall fees were 
reduced by the government, the case for further subsidising part-time students to bring about a fee 
reduction would weaken.  
Criticism 
The primary argument against either the specific proposal above, or more generous tuition fee 
reductions, is that the decline in part-time study has chiefly occurred in courses that do little to 
improve labour market outcomes; therefore no remedies need be offered. This case rests on the fall 
in numbers having been particularly pronounced in sub-bachelor qualifications and among learners 
aged over 30, both of which have lower average salary returns relative to younger learners 
undertaking bachelor level study.70, 71, 72  
                                                          
viii The high likelihood of further behavioural responses, such as fewer students taking out tuition fee loans and 
instead paying the new lower price upfront, also complicates costing this policy.  
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While true, estimates of the net present value to the Exchequer of completing sub-bachelor 
qualifications, which tend to be studied by older learners, do show positive returns of sufficient size 
to justify a small additional subsidy.73 Additionally, to avoid inadvertently providing greater subsidies 
to low return qualifications, the government could selectively offer the part-time subsidy to ensure it 
is well-targeted. As with further ELQ exemptions, this could be done on a qualification type and 
subject basis, with labour market needs and earnings returns determining eligibility.  
Conclusion 
Given the fall in part-time student numbers has negatively affected widening participation, and that 
debt aversion and price sensitivity among this group make expanding loan eligibility an ineffective 
response, further taxpayer subsidies are justified.  
To effectively use subsidies to boost part-time numbers, the government should explore offering a 
teaching grant to providers that enrol mature and part-time students from low-income households, 
on the basis that they charge a fee that is commensurately reduced. Doing so on a means-tested 
basis will target the subsidy to address the fall in disadvantaged students entering higher education 
as a result of the 2012 tuition fee rise. To achieve better value for money, the government should 
also consider restricting any part-time teaching grant to qualifications and subjects with above 
average earnings returns, or use the same eligibility rules as those applied to student loans. If the 
government decides to reduce the maximum level of tuition fee charged across the board, there 
may be no further reason to increase subsidies for part-time students.  
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Easing Equivalent and Lower Qualification funding restrictions 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
Equivalent and Lower Qualification (ELQ) restrictions prevent those with an existing qualification at 
or above the level they are seeking to study at from accessing tuition and maintenance loans. For 
students who self-finance to pay their tuition fee, ELQ restrictions also mean no teaching grant 
funding will be provided to their institution. Though not an issue for qualifications which attract little 
to no teaching grants, this can be a significant impediment to an institution taking on a student in 
more heavily subsidised lab-based qualifications. As a result, some institutions charge a 
supplementary fee to ELQ students which brings their total tuition fee charge over the £6,935 annual 
cap for part-time study.74 Though ELQ rules apply to both full and part-time study, it affects the 
latter much more as a significantly higher proportion of part-time entrants already hold a prior 
qualification. 
Labour first introduced ELQ restrictions in 2008/09, at a time when most higher education funding 
was delivered via teaching grants and student numbers were capped. At this time the government 
was focussing on expanding higher education access for school leavers. The decision was made to 
partially fund this expansion by removing support from those studying a second higher education 
qualification, unless it was at a higher level. At the time an exemption to ELQ rules was made for 
those studying towards a Foundation degree, and some specific subjects at bachelor’s degree level.  
The immediate impact of the ELQ restrictions introduced in 2008/09 is difficult to judge as 
institutions responded to the change in a variety of ways, with some delaying raising prices for ELQ 
students to compensate for the lost teaching grant funding and others ending provision.75 By 
2010/11, it was estimated that this change caused part-time fees to rise by 27 per cent from 
2007/08 levels.76 Not long after the 2012 fee rise occurred, when part-time students were extended 
access to tuition loans to overcome credit constraints, ELQ students were left unable to access 
tuition loans to cover the much larger fees now charged.  
 Equivalent and Lower Qualification (ELQ) restrictions remove access to higher education 
grants and loans for those seeking to study at a level at or below which they are already 
qualified. 
 ELQ restrictions have been cited as a key factor in the fall of part-time and mature 
student numbers, alongside the 2012 tuition fee increase.  
 In recent years exemptions to these rules for STEM and computing subjects have 
generated small increases in demand from qualifying part-time ELQ students.  
 As the government’s Industrial Strategy highlights, expanding life-long learning and 
retraining opportunities is vital for the UK economy. 
 The government should consider introducing further subject exemptions to ELQ 
restrictions in fields likely to meet pressing labour market needs or have earnings 
returns that minimise non-repayment. Doing so is likely to come at only a modest cost 
to taxpayers.  
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While the clear intent of introducing 2008/09 ELQ restrictions was a reduction in mature and 
therefore part-time student numbers, the subsequent 63 per cent drop in part-time student 
numbers over the decade following has cast doubt over the policy.77 Several reports have now called 
for an increase in exemptions to ELQ restrictions, if not their wholesale abolition.78, 79, 80 In response 
to these calls the government has since 2015 introduced exemptions for those studying part-time 
towards bachelor degrees in STEM and computing fields.ix  
Further exemptions to ELQ restrictions are argued for on the basis that this would provide additional 
opportunities for mature learners to reskill. As the government’s Industrial Strategy argues, these 
are increasingly needed as working-years extend, and the pace of technological development 
hastens structural economic change.81  
Policy detail 
Specifying further exemptions to ELQ rules could be done on the basis of labour market needs and 
likelihood of loan repayment. A more discerning approach to providing loan eligibility is justified as 
those studying will in most instances already have been funded to complete a higher education 
qualification.x Broadening exemptions to include fields where the public sector suffers recruiting 
problems, as well as higher earning subjects (e.g. law and economics) would be in keeping with this 
approach. 
It is difficult to accurately estimate the cost of creating further exemptions to ELQ restrictions. This is 
chiefly due to uncertainties in forecasting behavioural responses to such a change. A recent Sutton 
Trust report notes that the costs of STEM field exemptions to ELQ rules have been relatively minor 
due to smaller than expected increases in uptake, though this is at least partially the result of poor 
advertising. 82 The report concluded that broadening exemptions to the ELQ policy would only come 
with ‘modest costs’. 
Broader trends suggest that further exemptions may not revive part-time ELQ student participation 
to levels seen prior to 2008/09. Exemptions allow access to tuition fee and maintenance loans, 
removing a credit barrier to further study, and providing teaching grants ensures fees are not above 
those faced by other students. However, this only puts ELQ students on the same footing as part-
time students studying at this level for the first time, whose participation rates are also falling.  
Criticism 
The primary objection to further relaxing ELQ rules is that state funding (whether grant or loan 
subsidies) should be prioritised to assist those who have not yet had the benefit of completing a 
higher education qualification, unless studying to up-skill to a higher level. This was the rationale 
provided by the then Secretary of State John Denham when defending the introduction of ELQ 
restrictions to a 2008 House of Commons committee inquiry.83 
                                                          
ix Current exemptions to ELQ policy apply to those seeking Foundation degrees, STEM and computing 
bachelor’s degrees on a part-time basis, and qualifications in certain public sector professions, such as 
medicine, nursing, social work or teaching, and those receiving Disabled Students’ Allowances. Note there are 
slight differences in current OfS (grant) and SLC (loan) exemptions.  
x Funding restrictions also apply to those seeking to study at an equivalent or lower lever, even if their prior 
qualification was not state funded.  
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While this explanation was defensible at the time, it no longer provides an adequate justification as 
the Coalition government intended for part-time student numbers to increase as a result of the 2012 
student finance reforms, and the subsequent uncapping of student places aimed for a rise in 
numbers more broadly.84  
A secondary objection is that relaxing ELQ restrictions might allow ‘perpetual students’ to enjoy 
access to maintenance support and tuition loans over multiple ‘back-to-back’ degrees. The 
aforementioned House of Commons committee inquiry examined this claim and found no evidence 
to support it.85 It also noted that the Open University’s survey of ELQ students prior to 2008/09 
found that 75 per cent were studying for vocational reasons, and only 8 per cent for personal 
enrichment.  
Sensible restrictions, like permitting only a set number of full-time equivalent years to access 
student finance in a given decade, could be implemented to prevent any attempt to access 
maintenance loans for successive qualifications.xi  
Conclusion 
The scale of the reduction in part-time and mature student numbers over the past decade justifies a 
considered policy response. Creating opportunities for reskilling by removing barriers to mature 
learners undertaking study at an equivalent or lower level is a clear way of ameliorating this decline. 
Given the government is currently investing in creating a National Retraining Scheme to promote 
workforce reskilling, further easing ELQ restrictions would provide consistency to the government 
policy.  
As The Sutton Trust’s Lost Part Timers report points out, the cost of granting further exemptions is 
likely to be modest given it would only remove a credit constraint to accessing higher education, 
leaving high fees (and therefore large loans) as a deterrent.  
The government should explore additional subject areas for ELQ exemptions to be introduced, 
selecting them on the basis of labour market demand and earnings returns to avoid subsidising 
second qualifications in fields that are unlikely to benefit those undertaking them. Outcomes of 
students who access student loans as a result of further ELQ rule exemptions should be monitored 
to ensure the change delivers value for money.  
  
                                                          
xi Note a limit of 16 years support for part-time study already exists with respect to part-time tuition fee loans.  
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4. Student finance 
When it comes to financing the higher education system, the government is likely to want a ‘win’ for 
students and graduates. Its challenge will be to deliver one without upsetting system progressivity, 
the budget deficit, and the long-run cost. This has become more of a challenge given the recent 
decision by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to reflect more of the long-run system cost in the 
current budget. 
While we will not consider what an ideal political settlement to the mix of graduate and taxpayer 
contributions might be, over the following pages we will set out the cost, distributional impact and 
trade-offs of restoring maintenance grants, changing the student loan terms, lowering tuition fees, 
and abolishing fees altogether.  
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Restoration of maintenance grants 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
In submissions to the Post-18 review’s call for evidence or in statements to the media, many in the 
higher education sector have advocated for maintenance grants to be restored. Since these grants 
were abolished for new students from 2016/17, maintenance support has been delivered exclusively 
via loans. 
The amount of maintenance loan that can be borrowed depends on the household income of 
graduates (typically their parent’s income for younger entrants). There is a minimum amount 
available to students regardless of household income and additional amounts for those from lower 
income households (see Figure 4.1). It is assumed that the shortfall between the maximum 
maintenance loan amount available to lower income background students and the amount an 
applicant is eligible for is made up by parent contributions or casual work.86 
  
 Due to the removal of maintenance grants from 2016/17, students from low income 
backgrounds now accumulate larger student loan debts during study. There are also 
concerns the loss of grants will prevent progress from being made in widening 
participation.  
 Restoring these grants has attracted considerable support throughout the Post-18 
review process. 
 The financial benefit of restoring grants would only accrue to low income background 
recipients who go on to earn high incomes, as the bottom 60 per cent of graduate 
earners do not pay off their student debt before it is written off after 30 years.  
 Growth in the higher education entry rate for students who are likely to have previously 
received maintenance grants has slowed considerably and no progress has been made 
towards narrowing the gap in entry rates in recent years. 
 Though there is not firm evidence that the removal of maintenance grants has harmed 
widening participation, the clear failure to make advances in recent years demands a 
response from government.  The government should detail and fund a new set of 
initiatives to kickstart progress in widening participation, which should consider the 
merits of restoring maintenance grants against additional investment in support for 
disadvantaged children in the school system.  
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Figure 4.1: Maintenance support by household income, students living away from parents not in London 
(2018/19) 
 
Source: Student Finance England and House of Commons Library 
Students are not obliged to take out the full value of the maintenance loan they are eligible for, but 
in practice approximately 98 per cent of those who take out a loan do so regardless of household 
income.87 
Turning to the case for restoring maintenance grants, two main arguments have been put forward. 
First, the result of the 2016 change is that students from lower income households now take on 
larger maintenance loan debts than peers from wealthier backgrounds. As the IFS note, this means 
that students from the poorest 40 per cent of families graduate with an average debt of £57,000 
compared to £43,000 for students from the richest 30 per cent of families.88 
The second argument put forward is that maintenance grants are necessary to sustain growth in the 
higher education application and entry rate of low income background students, who when 
surveyed show greater levels of debt aversion.89 90 
Finally, there are also concerns that the loss of maintenance grants may have made it harder for 
disadvantaged students to meet living costs, which could force more to drop out of study.91 
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Policy detail 
If maintenance grants were restored under the same terms offered previously, the student support 
system would shift from that depicted in Figure 4.1 to that shown in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Maintenance support (with grants restored) by household income, students living away from 
parents not in London (2018/19) 
 
Source: Student Finance England and House of Commons Library, with EPI modelling 
Returning to grants would shift approximately £1.7 billion of the cost of maintenance support from 
graduates to taxpayers for the 2017/18 student cohort. However, the long-run cost is closer to £350 
million per cohort, as much of the maintenance loan debt would have never been repaid and would 
eventually be written off by the government.92  
Criticism 
That low income background students accrue higher student loan debt on average is concerning, but 
this is not solely a product of the removal of maintenance grants. As described earlier, the 
maintenance loan system allows those from low income backgrounds to borrow more generous 
amounts, thereby incurring larger student loan debts. This disadvantages high and low income 
background students in different ways, with those among the former put in a difficult financial 
position if unable to draw on parental support. As such, the disparity in average loan debts on 
graduation could alternatively be addressed by ending the means-testing of the loan system to allow 
high income background students to accumulate more debt. 
Another consideration is that under the income contingent repayment terms of the student loan 
system, the size of debt accumulated has material consequence solely for higher earning graduates. 
As only the top two deciles of graduate earners fully repay their student loans, the lowest earning 60 
per cent would see no material benefit if they received maintenance grants.93 Indeed, most of the 
gains would be captured by just the top ten per cent of graduate earners.94 
The extent to which the removal of grants has harmed widening participation is also not entirely 
clear. While the rate at which both 18-year olds where were previous in receipt of Free School Meals 
(FSM, a proxy for economic disadvantage) and those from the lowest participation areas (POLAR3) 
enter higher education continues to increase, the average improvement in the former has declined 
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significantly in the three years following the withdrawal of maintenance grants. While this reflects a 
cohort-wide slowdown in entry rate growth, disadvantaged school leavers have experienced this 
more acutely. As a result, the government’s progress in narrowing the higher education progression 
gap has either been minimal (POLAR3) or absent to the point of reversal (FSM) (see Figure 4.3). 
There is now little chance the government can meet its target of 27 per cent of children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds entering higher education by 2020; the rate currently sits at 20.4 per 
cent, up from 17.8 per cent in 2015 when the target was set.95  
Figure 4.3: Higher education entry rate gap by POLAR3 and FSM status (Age 18 entrants, England).  
  
 
Source: UCAS 
However, it is hard to determine causality, as the student finance system changed in other ways at 
the same time grants were abolished, and there is a relatively short period of time prior to the 
abolishment of grants to observe parallel trends in higher education application and entry by 
student background since the 2012 reforms.xii Progress in widening participation was slow prior to 
the removal of maintenance grants in 2016, and the trajectory since then may have occurred 
regardless.   
There are also few international studies that can shed further light. While many studies show a clear 
positive relationship between raising maintenance grants and higher education entry, especially for 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds, few investigate the impact of removing grants while holding 
total maintenance support constant by replacing them with larger income contingent loans.96 The 
one available study which does investigate substituting loans for grants at a specific US university 
found no impact on application rates from low income background students overall, though there 
                                                          
xii Alongside removing maintenance grants, in 2015 the government also announced that the then £21,000 
repayment threshold would be frozen for the next five years.  
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was weak evidence that low income students from minority ethnic backgrounds became more likely 
to apply after the change.97  
Turning to the impact losing maintenance grants has had on those in higher education with respect 
to non-completion; data is not yet available to enable an assessment. It is worth noting that when 
maintenance grants were withdrawn the total amount of maintenance support available to students 
from low income backgrounds rose by 8 per cent (£660 pa) in real terms due to a more generous cap 
on total loan values.98 Therefore students should not have come under greater financial pressure, 
providing that loan take-up rates did not fall. There is not student survey data available yet to 
ascertain whether the likelihood of disadvantaged background students taking out loans has 
declined.xiii Moreover, with over 98 per cent of those with household incomes that would have 
previously qualified for grants taking out the maximum amount on offer in 2017/18, those that do 
apply for loans now have more cash-in-hand than they previously would.99 Unless subsequent 
research shows the odds of applying for maintenance loans have declined among this group, we can 
conclude that cost of living pressures have not risen due to the abolition of maintenance grants.  
Overall, it is difficult to establish whether the removal of maintenance grants has adversely impacted 
student recruitment or retention. Given the difference in higher education participation rates 
between advantaged and disadvantaged background school leavers is explained almost entirely by 
attainment in school, making investments in the school system to close this gap may be a more 
fruitful means of forwarding the widening participation agenda.100 
Conclusion 
The government must be careful to avoid making a decision on weak evidence due to the volume of 
voices advocating for a policy. As restoring grants will primarily benefit low income background 
students who go on to become high earning graduates, prioritising their reinstatement would only 
be justified if there was evidence that the policy had led to a reversal in widening participation.  
Though there is no conclusive evidence this has occurred yet, the failure to narrow the gap in higher 
education progression, particularly in the years since maintenance grants were abolished, demands 
a response from the government. If the government does not believe maintenance grants to be the 
best way to rekindle progress in widening participation, it has a duty to clearly outline and fund 
alternative policies (to at least the cost of restoring maintenance grants), such as investing in the 
school system to close the gap in attainment which is the key driver of different rates of higher 
education progression.  
  
                                                          
xiii While the Student Loans Company do provide an estimate of overall loan take-up rates for full-time 
students, as they do not hold household income data for non-applicants a breakdown of take-up by 
socioeconomic background cannot be reported. The only source of data on loan take-up by socioeconomic 
background is the government’s periodically commissioned ‘Student Income and Expenditure Survey’, which 
was last collected in 2014/15. That survey found full-time students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds 
took out maintenance loans at the same rate as other peers, though when controlling for other characteristics, 
they were significantly more likely to take out a loan. 
45 
Reducing tuition fees and raising grants 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
Throughout the Post-18 review process there has been speculation that a reduction in the permitted 
tuition fee cap would be a recommendation. This would no doubt be a popular move, especially for 
prospective students. Cutting fees would allow the government to scale back fees to the level 
envisioned when the 2012 student finance reforms were designed.  
The reason funding is now at a higher rate than anticipated is due to the reaction of higher 
education providers (henceforth, providers) to the tripling of the fee cap to a maximum of £9,000 
per annum in 2012. At the time, the government predicted average fees of £7,500 in 2012/13, and 
that charging the full £9,000 would only occur in ‘exceptional circumstances’.101 The reality was quite 
different; by 2016/17 only one university had a maximum course fee below £9,000 and over a third 
charged the full permitted fee for every course on offer. Relative to the Coalition’s expected fee 
(adjusted for inflation), the average fee observed was almost £900 higher in 2018/19 (see Figure 
4.4). 
   
 Funding for higher education providers has risen substantially in real terms since 2012, 
with the current level above that predicted by the Coalition due to higher than expected 
tuition fees.  
 Reducing the tuition fee cap has been suggested as a means of addressing concerns 
over the cost of tuition, while also returning the overall level of funding higher 
education providers receive to that envisioned by the 2012 reforms. 
 A fee reduction would favour higher-earning graduates by reducing their lifetime 
repayments substantially. Lower-to-mid earners would not benefit as they do not fully 
repay their student loan debt before it is written off.  
 If the government does opt to reduce tuition fee levels, the reduction should be at least 
partially offset by increasing teaching grants with priority given to higher cost subjects. 
This will reduce incentives to recruit into low-cost subjects to cross-subsidise other 
operations.  
46 
Figure 4.4: Fee levels at HEFCE funded institutions (cash terms) 
 
Source: OFFA 
Current fee levels also deliver HEIs more revenue than would have been permitted under the 
recommendations of the 2010 Browne review, which called for a levy on fee revenue for charges 
over £6,000.102 For a fee of £9,000, Browne’s proposal would have seen only £7,650 retained by the 
institution, with the difference returned to the Exchequer.  
Providers have gained considerably from these high fees, despite direct grant funding being cut. The 
IFS found overall funding per student rose by 25 per cent in real terms in the years following the 
2012 student finance reforms.103 This again contrasts with the expectations of the government at the 
time, that predicted only a 10 per cent increase.104  
Since 2015 the government has attempted to rein in this unexpected increase in funding. In 2015 a 
£120m cash terms cut to the recurrent teaching grant budget to 2019/20 was announced, and more 
recently the tuition fee cap was frozen at 2017/18 levels until 2019/20.105, 106 Due to these measures 
and reductions in capital grants, the OfS now forecasts a substantial real terms decline in per student 
funding over the next two years, though it will remain above pre-2012 levels.107  
Pending changes to the accounting treatment of student loans make shifting the balance of funding 
from student fees to teaching grants more palatable for the government than it was previously. 
Between this and the desire to placate student dissatisfaction with the student finance system, the 
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government now has a strong rationale to shift from reducing funding by cutting grants to reducing 
the tuition fee cap, and therefore the value of student loans taken out. 
Policy detail 
Submissions from several higher education bodies anticipate a reduction in the tuition fee cap, and 
state that without a compensatory increase in grant funding there would be serious financial 
problems for many providers.108 If the government were to reduce the fee cap there would be 
several options available, from fully compensating via teaching grants to offering no increase in 
grants.  
The analysis completed by London Economics on lowering the fee cap to £6,000 per annum shows 
that in the long-run £1.17bn of funding per cohort would shift from graduates to taxpayers, 
assuming providers were compensated in full for the loss of fee revenue by teaching grants at an 
upfront cost to the government of £3.32bn.109 The difference between the long-run cost and the 
upfront cost is a product of the large share of graduates who do not fully repay their debt before the 
write-off point. Accordingly, smaller decreases in the fee cap would result in proportionally even 
smaller long-run costs.  
Any shift of funding from loans to grants would also see an increase in current budget expenditure 
under current government accounting rules, as at present the transfer of funds from the 
government to higher education providers is treated differently depending on whether the amounts 
are grants or loans. Grants hit the budget as expenditure in the year they are paid, while loans - or at 
least their unpaid share – are only registered in the deficit in the year they are written off (for most, 
30 years after graduation). Thus, the current budget deficit is forced to bear the entirety of 
additional teaching grant expenditure, even though at present the government does not anticipate 
receiving all of the annual loan outlay back longer-term. However, the new accounting standards 
that will apply from September 2019 will significantly diminish the immediate budget impact of 
lowering fees, as the proportion unlikely to be paid off will count as a budget expense in the year 
loans are issued.  
If the government wishes to see overall higher education funding return to an amount closer to what 
was envisioned in 2012, a rise in teaching grants that does not entirely offset the loss of tuition fee 
revenue could be awarded.  
Lowering the tuition fee cap and raising teaching grants would also provide an opportunity to 
reallocate grants to unwind the incentive created by the 2012 reforms to expand recruitment into 
subjects that provide the largest opportunity for cross-subsidy.  
Higher education subjects are funded on the basis of five different bands depending on the cost of 
provision. Those that are more expensive to run (e.g. lab and field-based subjects) are funded at a 
higher rate than those that are less expensive (e.g. lecture-theatre based subjects). The relative 
funding level of these bands changed considerably after the 2012 reforms. As fees were allowed to 
increase to the £9,000 maximum across the board, lower-cost band D courses saw funding grow by 
almost 50 per cent, despite teaching grants being removed altogether (see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5: Changes in higher education funding per student, by course price group 
 
 
Source: IFS 
This change introduced an incentive for higher education providers to inflate their income by 
expanding provision in low-cost subjects to cross-subsidise other areas of activity. While there is no 
evidence to date this has occurred, this may present a temptation into the future.110 Lowering the 
tuition fee cap for courses and funnelling the offsetting teaching grants to high-cost subjects in 
bands A and B may head off potential distortion in student recruitment into the future.  
Criticism 
The distributional impact of lowering tuition fees favours high earning graduates. London Economics 
analysis shows lowering the fee cap to £6,000 results in no change in lifetime repayments for the 
bottom half of graduate earners while the top decile sees a reduction of approximately £14,500.111  
If higher education providers are not compensated for a reduction in fee revenue, they would be 
£3.2bn worse off per student cohort. This amounts to a loss of almost a third of revenue per student. 
Such a large reduction would leave providers with less revenue per student than prior to the 2012 
reforms. Given many institutions are likely to have committed to future outlays on the basis of 
current funding rates, such a stark reduction would have a severe impact on provision. This is 
particularly true for institutions that have borrowed funds to invest in major capital projects, for 
which a substantial loss of future revenues would threaten project and even institution viability.   
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Conclusion 
Reducing student fees would certainly meet the political needs of the government. However, a 
modest reduction in the tuition fee cap would also provide the government with an opportunity to 
rebalance subject funding levels to reduce incentives to recruit into subjects with low provision 
costs.  
The extent to which fees ought to be reduced is ultimately a political question, though the 
government must take into consideration that the winners of any fee reduction are high earning 
graduates, whilst any rise in teaching grants will be borne directly by taxpayers. Therefore, the 
government should ensure that any increase in teaching grants is no greater than the total value of 
lost fee income, to limit the impact on taxpayers. This could also reflect the level of funding intended 
in the 2012 reforms.  
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Loan terms and the balance of contributions 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
The government’s review explicitly sets out to “maintain the principle that students should 
contribute to the cost of their studies while ensuring that payments are progressive and income 
contingent”. The contribution of graduates to their studies, and the degree to which these 
contributions are progressive are largely determined by the terms of their student loans. These are 
currently made up of: 
 the loan size, as dictated by fees charged and the available maintenance loan 
 the repayment threshold,  
 the repayment rate i.e. the amount graduates repay each month, 
 the interest rate, charged on the outstanding loan balance, 
 the loan duration, i.e. the period after which the loan is written off, and the remainder is 
paid for by taxpayers 
Many of the submissions to the Post 18 review regarding the loan terms focussed on either the 
interest rates or the loan size, via the fee cap or maintenance support. There has been very little 
debate on the remaining loan terms. However, as our previous analysis has shown, changes to these 
terms can have a significant impact on the balance of contributions from taxpayers and high and low 
earning graduates. The government’s  decision in 2017 to lift the repayment threshold from £21,000 
to £25,000 shifted £2.3bn from graduates to taxpayers, with low and middle earning graduates 
seeing the biggest benefits.112,113  
As discussed in the previous sections, the mooted reduction in the fee cap with a compensatory 
increase in teaching grants would shift the balance from graduates to taxpayers, with high earning 
 The terms of student loans are designed to ensure a balance of contributions both 
between graduates and taxpayers and between higher and lower earning graduates.  
 
 Much of the debate on loan terms has focussed on the interest rates charged on 
outstanding student loans and on the overall loan size, as dictated by the fee cap and 
the size of available maintenance loans. 
 
 The main beneficiaries of the implied changes to loans size and interest rates would be 
high earners, broadly at the expense of taxpayers, via government expenditure. 
 
 Further changes to the remaining terms and conditions, including the repayment 
threshold, rate and period, that aim to maintain current levels of government 
expenditure and the taxpayer contribution are likely to come at the expense of lower 
earning graduates.  
 
 The government needs to pay due consideration to the overall impact of changes to the 
loan terms and should publish a detailed assessment of winners and losers alongside 
the review recommendations. 
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graduates becoming the main beneficiaries. Analysis from London Economics indicates that lowering 
the fee cap to £6,000 shifts £1.17bn from high earning graduates to taxpayers, whilst the bottom 
half of graduate earners will see no change in their lifetime repayments at all.114 Even the 
reintroduction of maintenance grants is not unambiguously progressive. Whilst they may be 
targeted at those from more disadvantaged backgrounds, most of the gains would be captured by 
just the top ten per cent of graduate earners. So here the balance of contributions shifts from 
taxpayers to high earning graduates from poorer backgrounds. 
Similarly, a reduction in interest rates would also shift the balance from higher earning graduates to 
taxpayers. Currently, student loans accrue interest at the Retail Price Index (RPI) rate plus 3 per cent 
during study, and a progressively levied rate between RPI (for salaries up to £25,000) and RPI plus 3 
per cent (from £45,000) after graduation. Analysis from the IFS indicates that the removal of “real” 
interest rates (those above RPI) during study would shift £0.25bn from graduates to taxpayers, with 
the higher earning 20 per cent of graduates seeing their lifetime contribution fall by 6 per cent, or 
£4,800, compared with no change at all for the lowest earning 20 per cent. 115 
Crucially, both a reduction in interest rates and a reduction in loan sizes have the potential to 
significantly increase taxpayer contributions and therefore government spending. With the terms of 
the review seeking to be “consistent with the Government's fiscal policies to reduce the deficit and 
have debt falling as a percentage of GDP”, it seems likely that the government will seek to make up 
the difference with other changes to the loan terms.116 Moreover, given so much of the debate has 
centred on graduate debt rather than graduate contributions, it may do so in ways that add to the 
latter rather than the former.  
Policy detail 
In order to ensure that the graduate contribution is maintained in a way that does not increase debt 
at graduation, the government would be left with several options: 
1. Reduce the repayment threshold, currently set at £25,000. 
As mentioned previously the repayment threshold was increased from £21,000 only recently in 
2017, shifting £2.3bn of contributions from mainly low to middle earning graduates to taxpayers. 
As such a reversal, or part reversal, in this policy would see contributions from low to middle 
earning graduates rise again, with a minimal impact on high earners. 
2. Increase the repayment rate, currently set at 9% of earnings above the repayment threshold. 
Increasing the repayment rate in isolation would increase graduate contributions by ensuring 
that more repayments are made before the remainder is written off by taxpayers at the end of 
the repayment period. This would reduce the lifetime repayments of the 14 per cent of 
(generally high earning) graduates who already pay off their loan within 30 years, as by paying 
off their outstanding debt faster they will incur less debt interest. The 24 per cent of graduates 
whose earnings remain below the current repayment threshold would see no change. However, 
the remaining 62 per cent of (middle earning) graduates who pay some, but not all, of their debt 
will see an increase in their lifetime contribution. 117 An increase to the repayment rate may also 
have the adverse impact of reducing incentives for graduates to work or earn more.  
3. Increase the repayment period, currently set at 30 years after graduation. 
Increasing the repayment period in isolation would increase graduate contributions by causing 
those graduates who were still paying off their loan after 30 years (when the loan would 
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otherwise be written off) to continue making payments. Unpublished research from London 
Economics, based on their loan repayment model, estimates that increasing the repayment 
period from 30 years to 40 years would transfer £985m of costs from taxpayers to graduates. 
The profile of those affected is similar to those affected by an increase in the repayment rate. 
The 14 per cent of generally high earning graduates who pay off their loan before 30 years 
would clearly see no change. The 24 per cent of graduates whose earnings remain below the 
repayment threshold would also be unaffected, assuming they don’t experience a sudden 
earnings hike late in their career. Once again, the worst affected group would be the middle 
earning 62 per cent of graduates who would still be making payments after 30 years.  
Clearly any combination of the above changes would compound their impact. For example, 
increasing the repayment rate and repayment period together would see significantly increased 
contributions from middle earners, with almost no change for the high earners who currently pay off 
their debt. And combining a reduction in the repayment threshold with an increase in the repayment 
rate and/or the repayment period would have a significant impact on those low earners whose 
income straddles the interval between the current repayment threshold and the new, lower, 
threshold. 
Criticism 
The review seeks to continue with the progressive approach to graduate contributions of the current 
system. However, it is clear that a reduction in fees, the reintroduction of grants and reductions in 
the interest rate would all tip the balance in favour of higher earning graduates, reducing the 
progressivity of the system.  
Moreover, although advocates of the current system herald its progressive nature, research from 
London Economics shows that the picture is more complex than that. It certainly is the case that at 
any point in time, graduates with higher earnings will pay more than graduates with lower earnings. 
However, the impact of real interest rates is that middle earning graduates who pay off, or almost 
pay off, their loan towards the end of the repayment period will pay more than graduates who have 
high earnings early in their career and so complete their repayment earlier. For example, on average 
a male finance professional will pay off his loan aged 38, repaying £55,000 or 2 per cent of their 
lifetime income. This compares with the average male nurse, who will pay £59,000 after 30 years, 
equivalent to 3.6 per cent of their lifetime earnings.xiv 
So, to maintain or improve upon the progressivity of the current system, further changes would 
need to tip the balance back in favour of graduates with lower or middling earnings. However, if the 
government seeks to maintain the balance of graduate to taxpayer contributions, all the possible 
changes discussed above (summarised in table 4.1 below) are regressive in their distributional 
consequences. This is a natural consequence of the pressure on the review to reduce headline loan 
debt figures (which largely just impact the actual contributions from high earners), a desire to 
maintain higher education funding at comparable levels and the government’s commitment to its 
fiscal rules. Under these conditions greater contributions over a longer period from low to middle 
earning graduates seems inevitable. 
  
                                                          
xiv Outstanding loans in real terms, and discounted to present values 
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Table 4.1: Possible changes to the loan terms and their likely distributional impact  
Loan term 
change 
Currently Implied direction of change: 
Graduate contribution Progressiveness 
Reducing fee 
(cap) level 
£9,250 ↓ ↓ 
Maintenance 
grants 
£4k - £8.7k 
depending on 
household 
income (outside 
London) 
↓ ↑ 
(by 
background) 
↓ 
(by 
earnings) 
Interest rates 
reduction 
3% during study, 
0-3% + RPI after 
graduation 
↓ ↓ 
Threshold 
reduction £25,000 ↑ ↓ 
Increasing 
repayment 
rate 
9% of earnings 
above the 
threshold 
↑ ↓ 
Increasing 
repayment 
period 
30 years ↑ ↓ 
 
Conclusion 
If the government seeks to maintain the graduate contribution whilst lowering headline student 
debt, it seems likely that changes to the terms of student loans will become less progressive.  
Equity within the graduate population cannot and should not be the only consideration when setting 
the terms for student loans: Firstly, universities need to be funded to ensure a high-quality 
education and to meet the needs of a changing labour market; secondly, the incentives for students, 
especially the most disadvantaged, to continue to higher education should be considered; finally, 
and possibly most crucially, equity beyond the graduate population must be considered.  
Around half of young people do not attend higher education and so do not benefit from the 
associated earnings returns. Yet taxpayers, which includes both this group and graduates, contribute 
almost half of the cost. 118 This apparent inequity would not be so stark if the non-HE education and 
training alternatives for young people were more appealing. But funding levels remain low by 
comparison, with poor recognition by employers.  
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One of the benefits of the current system is that it aims to be progressive within the graduate 
population, and there are risks that it will become less so. We do not state here what the “correct” 
balance of contributions between taxpayers and high earning graduates and low earning graduates 
should be. However, the government should set out the distributional consequences of its 
recommendations, including on those not studying in higher education, with a clear distinction 
between the impact on lifetime contributions and the impact on headline student debt figures. 
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Abolishing tuition fees 
Summary 
 
Rationale and background 
Though abolishing tuition fees is unlikely to be a recommendation of the Post-18 review given its 
remit, it is a key pillar of Labour Party education policy and therefore worthy of consideration. The 
2017 Labour Party manifesto justified removing tuition fees with reference to both the principle of 
free education and an argument that the current system ‘priced out’ prospective students.119 
Specifically, a fall in UCAS applications in the 2017 admission cycle was cited as evidence that this 
might now be occurring. This decrease was chiefly a result of the declining absolute size of the 
school-leaver cohort, though the application rate among this group continued to rise.120 However, 
that year did see a continuation of the steep decline in mature student applications (down by 18 per 
cent).121 Applications to nursing courses also fell by 23 per cent in England, a response to the end of 
NHS bursaries which had previously covered the cost of tuition for students.122  
Policy detail 
Abolishing fees and replacing the lost income with direct grants to higher education providers would 
be a dramatic shift, but not an unprecedented one. The New Zealand government began phasing out 
tuition fees for first-time university students in 2018, and several German states have done so over 
the last decade.123, 124  
The long-run cost of abolishing fees and offsetting the funding loss to providers with teaching grants 
is estimated to be approximately £4.6bn per cohort.125 This is considerably less than the £9.8bn in 
additional teaching grants required to compensate providers for lost tuition fee income, which owes 
to the fact that not all student loan debt issued is expected to be paid back. Accordingly, the £9.8bn 
in teaching grant expenditure per cohort would count towards government spending in the current 
budget.126 As pending changes to the accounting of student loans will substantially increase the 
budget deficit by treating any portion of the loan not expected to be paid back as an expense, from 
September 2019 the budget impact of abolishing fees will appear relatively smaller. 
 Abolishing tuition fees is out of the scope of the government’s review but it is a core 
pillar of the Labour party’s education policy, which fears high fees deter prospective 
students. There is limited evidence to suggest this is true, with the exception of part-
time and mature students.  
 There is a large upfront cost to making higher education study free, though the long-run 
cost has fallen considerably due to the increase in the repayment threshold announced 
in September 2017, which substantially reduced the lifetime repayments expected from 
graduates. 
 The government is right to not consider abolishing tuition fees outright, as the goals of 
this policy could be better met by more targeted investments to boost part-time and 
mature student participation and reduce the school attainment gap, which is the 
primary driver of the lower rate of progression to higher education seen among low 
income households.  
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It is also worth noting that the long-run cost of abolishing fees has fallen by approximately £1bn 
since the government’s 2017 decision to lift the repayment threshold from £21,000 to £25,000.127 
This is a result of the higher threshold lowering the proportion of student debt that is expected to be 
paid back, which shifted the balance of contributions from 35 per cent taxpayer funded to 47 per 
cent.128 Abolishing tuition fees would shift the system towards being majority taxpayer funded, 
though some graduate contributions would remain via maintenance loan repayments.  
Criticism 
With respect to the distributional impact, middle and high earning graduates would capture most of 
the financial benefits that come from removing tuition fees. Modelling from the IFS and London 
Economics show that the bottom three deciles of graduate earners would see little to no benefit.129 
130Given children from richer families are more than twice as likely to undertake higher education 
study, the overall distributional consequences would be sharply regressive.131   
The issue of debt aversion, which some worry may deter certain groups from accessing higher 
education, is undoubtedly a real phenomenon. When surveyed, young people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds report lower willingness to accrue debt to access higher education.132 However, in the 
years that have followed the tripling of tuition fees, the proportion of school leavers entering higher 
education from low participation and free school meal backgrounds has risen.133 This suggests that 
the debt aversion stated in surveys does not carry through to actual behaviour. As discussed in 
chapter 3, part-time and mature students have responded to the rise in tuition fees in a way that 
reflects their aversion to high fees and debt. Subsidies for these students specifically to lower their 
fees could be a far less costly way to address this challenge than an across-the-board fee reduction.  
However, there are more targeted approaches to tackling debt aversion in specific subgroups than 
abolishing fees for students of all backgrounds. Better education in schools of how the income 
contingent loan system makes student debt much more favourable than normal debt could assist in 
addressing this barrier. Indeed, a randomised controlled trial of an in-school information campaign 
on student finance showed that such an approach can improve student knowledge of the loan 
system and reduce perceived financial barriers to study.134  
The money spent on abolishing tuition fees could also be more productively directed to closing the 
gap in school attainment. IFS analysis shows that the difference in higher education participation 
rates between advantaged and disadvantaged background school leavers is explained almost 
entirely by prior attainment.135 This suggests that financial considerations and debt aversion are not 
significant constraints to accessing higher education, and that funds should be directed to reduce 
the gap in school attainment to advance the widening participation agenda.  
Conclusion 
Removing tuition fees altogether would primarily benefit high earning graduates at the expense of 
taxpayers, and it would do little for graduates with lower earnings. There is also no evidence that, 
other than part-time and mature students, access to higher education among disadvantaged groups 
would expand as a result.  
Given the £4.58bn long-run cost, the overall regressive impact, and the availability of more targeted 
remedies to pursue most of the objectives that abolishing fees aims to resolve, the government was 
right to keep this policy out of scope for the review.  
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